Michigan Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 2

1962

Paul & Schwartz: Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail
Harry Kalven Jr.
University of Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal
Writing and Research Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Harry Kalven Jr., Paul & Schwartz: Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail, 61 MICH. L. REV. 414 (1962).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/14

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

414

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL. By James C. N. Paul and
Murray L. Schwartz. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 1961. Pp. 883. $7.o0.

This is in many ways an exemplary piece of contemporary legal scholarship. It is a monograph on a single legal topic. The topic is rich in color
and interest and has social significance. And the study was planned as
one in depth, approaching the problem along several dimensions by paral-
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leling a survey of legal doctrine with a close look at legislative history,1 and
with a close look too at the law in actual operation. This last in particular
has required use of the research techniques of the field study, and among
other things, the book may well be viewed as a substantial addition to the
new and growing literature of empirical legal studies. Further, the authors
do not merely report but add a critical essay exploring the rationale for
obscenity regulation and providing a series of recommendations as to the
proper role of the federal government in this field. Federal Censorship
thus shows evidences both of an impressive amount of digging for information and of an impressive amount of reflection on policy. Finally, if read
closely, it furnishes a welcome storehouse of ammunition in its data and
conclusions for those who, like myself,2 would like to see postal censorship
disappear from the American scene.
Yet despite this impressive roster of virtues, there were for me certain
puzzling shortcomings in the book. With the customary perversity of the
reviewer I shall devote my space to an elaboration of these points rather
than attempt an evaluation of some of the authors' challenging proposals
for reform of the law in this area.3
A first difficulty is that the book seems at many points to lose its focus.
It would be difficult with a topic of this sort to allocate satisfactorily space
and emphasis between obscenity problems and postal problems.4 But I cannot down the impression that the authors became too interested in the
general obscenity problem. One consequence is that the book is open to the
charge of rehashing much that has become familiar in the prior full studies
of the law of obscenity that we have had from Lockhart and McClure and
from St. J ohn-Stevas.5 The other consequence is that at points they underplay
problems distinctive to postal control. Since we have had so little serious
1 The legislative history yields perhaps the most refreshing materials in the book.
There is fascinating material from Lord Lynhurst's witty reactions to Lord Campbell's
Act in 1857, to the Calhoun debates in 1836 over proposals for postal censorship of
abolitionist tracts, to the one-man lobby of Anthony Comstock, to the debate between
Senator Cushing and Senator Smoot in 1930 over the obscenity provisions of the Tariff
Act.
2 My own views on the law of obscenity have been set forth in the Metaphysics of
the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT REv. I; and Obscenity and the Law, Z1
LmRARY Q. 201 (1957); also in Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 769 (1957).
s The book covers not only postal censorship but Customs as well. The authors, in
their final recommendations, leave some role for federal administrative screening via
Customs. See pp. 227-28; 235-37.
4 The most arresting of the authors' ideas is the effort to treat obscenity as a relational concept depending on the audience and the manner of circulation. In developing
this approach, the authors properly find great significance in the Kinsey case, United
States v. Thirty-one Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). This sort of graduated
"adults only" approach to the problem seems to me attractive in theory but probably
"not worth the candle" in practice. See pp. 205-19.
Ii Lockhart 8: McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Lockhart 8: McClure, Literature, the Law of
Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); and ST. JoHN·STEVAS,
OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956).
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study of these problems to date, this seems to be something of a pity. I had
hoped to find the arguments on the legality of postal censorship vigorously
marshalled and scrutinized; instead the relevant materials are scattered
throughout the book and the conclusions are stated so quietly that unless
one reads with care he may well miss the authors' conclusions that postal
censorship has probably been unconstitutional 6-as well as inadvertent
from the viewpoint of Congress7-for these many years, and should be
abandoned in the future. 8
Certainly some good points are slighted. There is little explicit wrestling with the anomaly of applying a national standard of "community
sentiment" in this area, given the wide variety of sentiments in New York
and Massachusetts, for example.9 And this without the use of the jury.
Nor do we ever get a report from the interview materials on how the administrators themselves sought to solve this dilemma.
Again because they decide to stick with obscenity and ignore other
forms of postal censorship,10 the authors do not confront the interesting
fact that Congress has so rarely attempted to build from the rationale on
which postal activity is said to be legally justified to any other form of
censorship-although if the legal arguments are good at all they would
give Congress far wider power over communications than it has thus far
chosen to exercise. This seems to have been the point of the celebrated
Esquire case11 which the book treats as primarily concerned with limiting
the sanction of revocation of second-class mail privileges. The larger significance of the case, I think, lies in the obvious reluctance of the Court to
permit postal censorship to be expanded beyond obscenity.
Nor does the book pay sufficient attention to the significance of the old
precedent that the fourth amendment does apply to the postal power. 12 This
See pp. 31-37, 159, 166.
See pp. 23, 28, 231. It is perhaps unfair to charge that the authors failed to anticipate the reaction of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas to the
statutory construction problem in the very recent decision in Manuel Enterprises, Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). But it is striking that reading the book would never
prepare one for the fact that, in 1962, three Justices of the United States Supreme Court
would seriously and flatly hold that Congress had never authorized postal censorship.
Further, it might be observed that the legislative history materials are arguably more
fully and effectively handled in the opinions of both Justices Brennan and Clark than
in the book-I think primarily this is the result of their being vigorously marshalled
in the opinions.
s See p. 227. The book also suggests a specific list of reforms if it is to be retained;
see pp. 233-35.
9 In Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), it is refreshing to find that
Mr. Justice Harlan did confront this problem squarely. He stated: "We think that the
proper test under this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States
whose population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national
standard of decency." Id. at 488.
10 Seep. xi.
11 Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946), discussed in the book at pp. 73-77.
12 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). As the authors carefully point out, this part
of the opinion is dictum, but an unchallenged dictum. See pp. 32-33.
6
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raises the puzzler of why then the first amendment does not equally apply;
and, moreover, it illuminates on what a curious house of cards the postal
censorship power has been built. Under this ruling the post office cannot
administratively touch first-class mail; hence, the entire edifice of postal
control rests on the fact of mail subsidies and on the permission given for
that reason to the postal authorities to inspect second-class mail.
Finally, the intricate and mysterious legal issue of the status of prior
restraints keyed to obscenity seems to me not to have been dealt with persistently enough. Are the precedents on movie censorship applicable to
postal censorship?lS
There are two other puzzles with the book that reflect the desire of
Professors Paul and Schwartz to give their study a touch of sociological
significance and perhaps suggest points of a more general reach. First, the
authors decided to view the problem in historical perspective and to organize their exposition along chronological lines. As a study in the process
of legal and social change I do not think the book comes off and I think it
was a mistake to cast it in so ambitious a mold. The large time periods into
which the basic exposition is divided struck me as highly arbitrary and lent
themselves to such unfortunate subtitles as: "Part II. Development from
1930 to 1945: How Law and Censorship Responded to Social Change"; or
again: "Part III. Post War Developments: Another Period of Evolution,
1946 to 1956." Presumably it is this perspective, too, which produced sentences such as: "What was happening?-sober, intelligent, objective Americans wanted to know. Where were we going? Where should we be going?"14
Moreover, this historical structure produces a very choppy and confusing sequence as the authors hop from tracing legal doctrine to tracing
legislative history to tracing law in action over the four major time periods.
I have rarely encountered a book which seems so much the victim of its
basic plan of organization.
We are told in the introduction that the study involved considerable
empirical research with interviews with officials, digging in old files, etc.15
And the reporting out of this effort to document the law in action looms
large in exposition. It is for me the key puzzle of the book that I did not
find the harvest from this empirical attack more rewarding. To a minor
extent this may be the fault of the authors; they do not report their field
work directly and with the professional empiricist's touch. We never learn
how this part of this study was designed, just who was interviewed, and just
what the results from the interviews were. But the difficulties in their path
must have been formidable. Presumably they could find little in the way
13 The book suggests that the answer may be "no"; see p. 159. There is a dangerous
tendency to handle constitutional issues by counting Justices-a practice that may have
already rendered certain conclusions obsolete upon the appointments of Justices White
and Goldberg.
14 P. 188.
15 Pp. xii-xv.
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of existing records-their best material often seems to have come from cases
that reached the courts and the official reports.
The topic appears in retrospect to have been against them too. It is
not dear just how one would measure how much postal censorship there
has been. And with a substantive criterion like obscenity it is not clear how
one can profitably compare the law on the books with the law in action. The
authors spend time and effort carefully collecting and describing for us
particular instances of postal censorship; these items are, to be sure, colorful
and amusing, but they do not tell us much since we do not know with
what to compare them. Federal Censorship thus provides a major instance
for consideration in estimating the kind of enlargement of insight the
current movement toward sociological studies of legal phenomena is likely
to give us.
Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Professor of Law,
University of Chicago

